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This essay explores several dimensions of the debate between security and privacy that
accompanies many anti-terrorism and law enforcement proposals.
T lie debate is often framed, either implicitly orexplicitly, as a balancing of the tangible harms that a
security proposal would prevent, against the intangible
harms that an intrusion on privacy would cause. This
approach presents the choice between, for example, the
disastrous effects of a terrorist airline hijacking, and the
relatively minor feeling of discomfort that might flow
from presenting a national ID card before boarding.
Given those limited choices, what right-thinking person
would not choose the latter? This framework of balancing
tangible against intangible harms is not merely a
rhetorical strategy selected by the proponents of security
measures. It is also a way of understanding the debate
that flows naturally from the perception that privacy is a
mere abstraction, a luxury with little concrete value.
This essay focuses on three ways in which the tangible-
versus-intangible decision making framework both
overvalues security and undervalues privacy. First, the
framework is incomplete because it fails to account for
the many unintended consequences that usually flow
from security measures. The cumulative effect of those
unintended consequences gradually erodes society's very
conception of privacy. Yet the tangible-versus-intangible
framework implicitly focuses on short-term benefits and
consequences, necessarily excluding the long-term
effects on privacy.
Second, the contextual specificity that characterizes the
tangible-versus-intangible framework overemphasizes
the harms on the tangible side of the scale. By embedding
the choice between security and privacy in a concrete
factual context (such as boarding a plane), the framework
all but guarantees that people will decide to guard against
the tangible harms.
Finally, the framework draws a false distinction
between tangible breaches of security and intangible
intrusions on privacy. In fact, the tangible results that
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security proposals promise are often empirically suspect.
Instead, security proposals serve largely intangible goals,
such as allaying people's fears. In contrast, privacy
intrusions can have quite tangible consequences that
disrupt and inhibit social behavior.
I. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE
EXPECTATION-DRIVEN CONCEPTION OF
PRIVACY
T he tangible-versus-intangible framework described
above invariably understates the impact of any
particular security measure on privacy. This is so for two
related reasons. First, the framework fails to account for
the many unintended consequences that inevitably
accompany most privacy-intrusive security measures.
Second, the framework ignores the fact that our
conception of privacy is vllnerable to incremental
encroachment not only by the initial security measure,
but also by the unintended consequences that follow. 1
The tangible-versus intangible framework, however,
implicitly focuses on short-term benefits and
consequences, and therefore excludes long-term effects
on privacy.
A. Unintended Consequences
Unintended consequences come in several different
forms. The first is secondary use, which occurs when
information created or collected for one purpose is used
for another, or when an information collection technique
developed for one purpose is used for another.2 One of
the most widely acknowledged examples is the Social
Security number (SSN). After Congress passed the Social
Security Act, the newly-formed Social Security Board3 had
to find a way to track each worker's lifetime earnings,
social security contributions, and benefits. 4 The Board
assigned a number to each account, and assured citizens
that the SSN was to be used solely to identify citizens'
retirement accounts. 5 Yet in 1943, President Roosevelt
ordered all federal agencies developing their own
identification systems to use the SSN "exclusively."6 Over
the next five decades, the SSN's uses spread like wildfire,
and by 1998 the Secretary of Health and Human Services
acknowledged that the SSN was "in such extraordinarily
wide use as to be a defacto personal identifier. ' 7 Today,
someone who refuses to divulge her SSN will find it
practically impossible to conduct everyday transactions.8
This is not a peculiarly American phenomenon.
Identifying numbers in Canada, Australia, the
Netherlands, and Austria have all been put to widespread
secondary uses.9
Secondary uses can flow to government as well as from
it. For decades, direct marketers have collected vast stores
of personal information about potential customers. Data
profiling has become far more comprehensive with the
rise of the Internet, which has put a great deal more
personal information at profilers' disposal. Consumers,
however, might be surprised to learn that businesses are
not just sharing profiles with one another -they are
sharing our profiles with law enforcement as well. 10
Sometimes law enforcement need not even ask for the
information. Hosts of businesses reportedly opened their
customer records to law enforcement agencies in the
aftermath of September 11, often in violation of the
privacy policies that they claimed they would honor
when they collected the data."' Moreover, the LUSA Patriot
Act 12 dramatically expanded the types of information
about our Web surfing that any "governmental entity" -




second kind of unintended consequences are disclosures
due to insufficient safeguards over personal
information~t l Any centralized database is vulnerable to
hacking, even in such supposedly secure organizations as
the Internal Revenuie Service.' 5 Accidental data
disclosures have also become increasingly common. For
example, credit agency E-xperiain, drug manufacturer Eli
Lilly & Co., and healthcare provider Kaiser Permanente,
have all mtstakenly divulged confidential information
online.' 6 Eli Lilly recently entered uito a consent deciee
with the FTC concerning the accidental disclosure sf the
e mail addresses of nearly 700 patients with mental
illnesses, which Eli Lilly collected through its Prozaccom
Web site.1 7 Similarly, the House En'ergy and Commerce
Commitee recently took its Web site offline after
discovering that an internal database concerning the
Enron investigation was left exposed to anyone with a
Web browser."'5
In addition to human erro, there is the problem of
human corruption. Centralized information is always at
the mercy of dishonest or coriupt individuals willing to
use it for their own personal or political gain. The abuses
of J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon a re legendary.1 9
But abuses of centralized databases and government
surveillance are routine, rather than mere historical
anomalies, Many secuiity threat models prediet that one
percent of an organization's staff will always "be willing
to sell or trade confidential information.'ce For example,
in a five-year period, 127 employees of the California
Department of Motor Vehicles were disciplined 'foi
facilitating ID fraud.'Zi Similarly, a Virginia notary public
was recently convicted of 'helping thousands of
undocumented immigrants., willegally obtain Viginia
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driver's licenses" and ID cards.
2 2
Until September 21, 2001, Virginia
allowed applicants to prove
residence with identity papers and a
notarized affidavit. 23 The Washington
Post reported that seven of the
September 11 hijackers had obtained
Virginia ID cards using that same
loophole.
24
A chilling General Accounting
Office report details abuse of
centralized crime databases by FBI
and other law enforcement officers.
25
The National Crime Information
Center ("NCIC") "is the nation's most
extensive computerized criminal
justice information system" consisting
of a centralized database at FBI
headquarters "and a coordinated
network of federal and state criminal
justice information systems."
26
"[Jinsiders pose the greatest threat to
NCIC because they know the system
and can misuse it by obtaining and
selling information to unauthorized
individuals, such as private
investigators, or altering or deleting
information in NCIC records.'27 The
report found numerous incidents
where insiders disclosed NCIC
information to "unauthorized
persons, such as private
investigators, in exchange for money
or other rewards."2s In one case, a
former Arizona law enforcement
officer used NCIC information he
obtained from three other officers to
track down and murder his estranged
girlfriend.29 A Pennsylvania terminal
operator used the NCIC to conduct
background searches for her
boyfriend -a drug dealer -who used
the information to determine
whether his new clients were
undercover agents. 30 And in the
tradition of Nixon's "dirty tricks,"
some local officials unlawfully used
NCIC information to discredit
political rivals.
31
B. Incremental Encroachment and
the Expectation-Driven Conception
of Privacy
In any privacy-related debate, it is
important to understand that privacy
is generally defined by our own
expectations. 32 Judicial privacy
doctrines developed under the
Fourth Amendment and in tort law
define the scope of privacy by
reference to whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a particular context.33 Even
legislative action on privacy issues
reflects social expectations of
privacy, Given the variety of
powerful interests that might be
adversely affected by privacy
protective legislation, such legislation
is extremely unlikely to pass unless it
is supported by strong public
perceptions of what is appropriately
kept "private" in a given context.
3 4
Privacy, in short, is only as extensive





into the private sphere may fail
because they conflict with firmly held
expectations of privacy.3 5 However,
repeated moderate intrusions by
governments and institutions capable
of influencing social behavior can
gradually erode expectations of
privacy. The necessarily imprecise
nature of group preferences means
that we usually find a "gray area"
where societal expectations are
unsettled. The gradual erosion of
privacy occurs through repeated
incursions into this gray area.
36
Thus, the effects of any single
encroachment in fact reach much
farther than the tangible-versus-
intangible framework can
acknowledge. The tangible-versus-
intangible framework focuses too
narrowly on the present, to the
exclusion of the inevitable
unintended consequences that will
diminish privacy expectations far
more than the initial security
proposal. The framework commonly
examines the extent to which a given
proposal would intrude on our
currenl expectations of privacy, and
asks whether that intrusion is worth
the promised security benefits.
To take just one example,
proponents of a national ID card
might suggest that limiting such a
card to uses at borders and airports
would have only minimal privacy
implications, in part because people
are already used to showing some
form of ID when they travel.3 7 But
that view ignores the unintended
consequences that would inevitably
follow the creation of a card, even for
initially limited purposes. 3 The urge
to expand the uses of a biometric-
based national ID -and the
centralized database that would
inevitably support it39 -would be
irresistible. A centralized database
would facilitate the card's uses by
government agencies responsible for
welfare benefits, law enforcement,
and medical data.40 Businesses
would push to use the national ID
card, perhaps at first for credit and
banking purposes, but eventually for
as many purposes as the SSN and
driver's license are currently used.
4 1
Such plans are already underway.
The American Association of Motor
Vehicles Administrators ("AAMIVA")
recently proposed uniform national
standards for all state-issued driver's
licenses, which would encode a
variety of information about each
license holder, including a "bionmetric
identifier."42 Companies are already
marketing scanners that can not only
read, but also store, information from
the AAM'vA-standardized driver's
license.43 Scanners are being
marketed to bars, restaurants, car
dealerships, and convenience stores,
and suggested for use by health
clubs, personal trainers, and for the
general retail market.44 AAMVA itself
has proposed sharing its model with
banks, the travel industry, car rental
agencies, insurance companies, and
retailers."15 Furthermore, as illustrated
above, centralized databases are ripe
for abuse from within and without,
and increase dramatically the chance
for accidental disclosures. As these
uses and abuses accumulated in
incremental steps, we would
gradually come to expect less and
less privacy in a variety of contexts -
clearing the way for further
encroachment. Each inch of ground
that society yields in the private
sphere renders the next inch more
vulnerable, Yet the tangible-versus-
intangible framework ignores these
long-term effects by limiting its
temporal focus to the present.
continued onpage 554
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security because it embeds the
choice between tangible and
intangible in a specific factual
context, such as the process of
boarding an airplane - a context that
is itself tangible. As explained below,
framing the question in such a
context inevitably leads people to
guard against the more tangible
harms.
In an age pervaded by cost-benefit
analysis, there is an urge to reduce all
policy decisions to a balance sheet.
But we lack a single currency in
which to measure the relative value
of the privacy and security interests.
Attempts to equate a "unit" of privacy
to a "unit' of security, for example,
are doomed to fail. As we attempt to
choose between these two
incommensurable goods,46 we lack a
simple, cost-benefit approach to the
balancing.
Of course, the mere fact that two
goods are incommensurable need
not skew the calculus in one
direction or the other; it simply
makes the choice more difficult.
Indeed, incommlensurability
characterizes Inost attempts to
balance competing goods.47 Despite
our lack of a common "metric" in
which to measure those goods, we
find ways to make hard decisions.
What does skew the calculus,
however, is the perception that
breaches of security lead to tangible
harms, while intrusions on privacy
lead to intangible harms. Proponents
of security measures can raise the
specter of specific, all too tangible
acts of violence. Failures of security
can lead to concrete harms that have
shaped our collective experience,
such as the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut, the bombing of
the American Airlines flight over
Lockerbie, Timothy McVeigh's attack
in Oklahoma City, and September 11.
Privacy, in contrast, is often
considered a purely abstract value,
one that we can sacrifice in a
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particular instance without risking
any real, tangible harm.48 Many who
argue for the preservation of privacy
stress its importance for purposes
that are themselves abstract, such as
personal autonomy,49 personal and
political identity, 50 and freedom of
expression and association.51
Moreover, privacy is a highly
subjective concept, one that can vary
from person to person.
52
Comparing tangible and intangible
consequences in the context of
specific security proposals is likely to
overstate the value of the tangible. As
Julie Cohen observed in a related
context, "Privacy, like other dignity-
related goods, has inherently
nonmonetizable dimensions. These
dimensions may be lost or distorted
beyond recognition in the translation
to dollars and cents."53 So a
consumer making a decision about a
transaction, with consequences
defined in monetary terms, will find it
difficult to translate the intangible,
nonmonetizable dimensions of
privacy into that decision making
equation. 54 The specific context in
which the consumer must decide
constrains her decision making
calculus,
A similar problem of context
frustrates privacy advocates in the
debate over privacy and security. 55
Debates over security proposals are
often grounded in specific factual
contexts in which the privacy
implications appear innocuous,
while a security breach could lead to
grave harm. British Home Secretary
David Blunkett colorfully contrasted
the danger of terrorist attacks with
abstract notions of privacy and
liberty: "We can live in a world with
airy-fairy civil liberties and believe
the best in everybody and then they
destroy us."56 Oracle CEO Larry
Ellison expressed a similar sentiment
in testimony submitted to a
congressional subcommittee
considering national ID cards:
Two hundred years ago,
Thomas Jefferson warned
us that our liberties were at
risk unless we exercised
'eternal vigilance.'
Jefferson lived in an age of
aristocrats and monarchs.
We live in a nuclear age
with the threat of terrorists
getting their hands on
weapons with the capacity
to destroy entire cities.
Only by giving our
intelligence and law
enforcement agencies
better tools and more
latitude to pursue terrorists
can we expect to save life
and liberty together.
57
Former National Security Agency
general counsel Stewart Baker
summed up this perspective:
We as a people are willing
to trade a little less privacy
for a little more security. If
using more intrusive
technology is the only way
to prevent horrible crimes,
chances are that we'll
decide to use the
technology, then adjust
our sense of what is private
and what is not.
58
Security proposals implicitly
summon images of a horrible reprise
to the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks, as well as attacks
using biological or nuclear weapons.
Juxtaposed against those images are
what some characterize as "airy-fairy"
notions of privacy. 59 Though they do
not explicitly deny that privacy has
some value in the abstract, they urge
people to sacrifice it in particular
cases to prevent "real," tangible
harms.60 With the issue framed in
such stark terms, one would be hard
pressed to argue that, in just this one
case, abstract privacy values should
not yield to the need to prevent
attacks by terrorists with biological
and nuclear weapons.
61
Furthermore, differences in the
scale upon which security and
privacy benefits are observable
exaggerate our perception of privacy
benefits as intangible and security
benefits as tangible. The example of
airport checkpoint searches helps
illustrate this point. As I am frisked or
scanned, I cannot possibly see the
cumulative effect across society of
implementing these types of uniform
measures. I experience only my
search and the searches of a few
continued onpage 571
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people before and after me. A single
individual cannot appreciate the full
effect of widespread personal
searches of everyday American
travelers.
In contrast, the security benefits
that appear to flow from the searches
seem quite tangible. I board the
plane with the knowledge that I pose
no risk, and the belief that those
around me pose no risk either, since
they all endured the same scrutiny as
I did. Then, after the flight goes
smoothly, the safe landing reinforces
the notion that security measures
increase my safety. Of course, the
many things that I failed to perceive
are precisely the things that would
undermine my confidence in security
measures. For example, I may not
have realized that the metal detector
through which my fellow passengers
and I passed had been inadvertently
unplugged. 62 I may not have noticed
one of my fellow passengers
boarding the plane despite the fact
that his driver's license did not match
the name on his ticket. 63 Nor might I
understand that such oversights are
inevitable in passenger checks and
baggage scans, because the "signal
rate" - the frequency with which
terrorists or impostors appear at the
gate or weapons appear in the
baggage - is so low. 64 Instead, I see
only the safe result, which confirms
my perception that security measures
produce tangible benefits, or more
specifically, that they avert tangible
harms.
The distortion of individual
perception in favor of security is
obviously heightened in the wake of
September 11. In today's climate,
with physical and emotional scars
from terrorist attacks still present on
the landscape and in our lives, the
perceived tangible benefits of
security measures are magnified in
the eyes of many. For that reason, we
should not be surprised at the surface
appeal of suggesting that we sacrifice
"a little " privacy to preserve the
tangible benefits of security. An
important task for privacy advocates
is to focus attention on how even
seemingly limited intrusions on
privacy can have consequences that
reach far beyond the limited context
in which they are proposed.
II. REVEALING THE TANGIBLE AS
INTANGIBLE
F inally, I suggest that the tangible-
versus-intangible framework is
misleading. Measures alleged to yield
tangible security benefits in fact serve
many intangible purposes.
Admittedly, in the wake of
September 11, it is difficult to
imagine a more tangible concern
than the destructive effects of a
terrorist attack. Many responses to
these attacks, however, are not
merely aimed at preventing such
tangible harms. Instead, they serve in
large measure to preserve merely the
perception of security - the intangible
notion that our government can, in
fact, protect us from terrorism.
Jeffrey Rosen's investigation of
Britain's experience with terrorism
and video surveillance illustrates
how security measures can serve
predominantly intangible concerns.
65
In the wake of two IRA bombings in
London's financial district, the
government responded by installing
surveillance cameras at the city's
entry points. 66 Fear of terrorism
continued, and the cameras -closed
circuit TV, or "CCTV" - multiplied
beyond anyone's expectations, both
in London and throughout Britain.
67
Under Prime Minister John Major, the
government devoted "more than
three-quarters of its crime-prevention
budget to encourage local authorities
to install CCTV."(6 R "[By 1998, 440 city
centers" had surveillance camera
networks.69 Rosen's report estimates
that "there are 2.5 million
surveillance cameras in Britain," and
that 300 different cameras
photograph the average Briton every
day.
70
How many terrorists has Britain
caught using this pervasive
surveillance network? None.
7 1
"Although the cameras in Britain
were initially justified as a way of
combating terrorism, they soon came
to serve a very different function. The
cameras are designed not to produce
arrests but to make people feel that
they are being watched at all
times."72 And the people monitoring
the cameras are most likely to focus
on unconventional behavior in
public, young men (especially if they
are dark skinned), and attractive
young women.73 Cameras in London
are most productive tracking "car
thieves and traffic offenders. 'The
technology here is geared up to
terrorism,"' said London's press
officer.74 "'The fact that we're getting
ordinary people -burglars stealing
cars -as a result of it is sort of a
bonus. 75 But there is no evidence
that the cameras have prevented
terrorism or other serious crime.
76
The national ID card debate offers
another timely illustration of the
intangible nature of security
concerns. Despite all best intentions,
a national ID card will not prevent
terrorism. Most countries have
national ID cards or ID numbers,
7 7
and yet terrorism is a problem across
the globe. September 11 hijacker
Khalid AI-Midhar was on the INS's
"watch list" of potential terrorists for
nearly a year before the attacks, yet
he boarded one of the hijacked
flights using a ticket he bought in his
own name.7 8 Seven of the hijackers
obtained fraudulent IDs from the
State of Virginia.7 9 Even more
disturbingly, the INS recently notified
a Florida flight school that it had
approved student visas for Mohamet
Atta and Marwan Alshehhi -six
months afterAtta and Alshehhi
carried out the September 11 attacks,
and in the midst of one of the most
important and publicized law
enforcement investigations in
history.80 Moreover, at Boston's
Logan Airport, from which one of the
September 11 flights originated, a
man recently passed through two
airport security checkpoints despite
the fact that the name on his
government-issued ID did not match
the name on his ticket.8 '
Nonetheless, in the wake of the
attacks, the American public threw its
support behind a national ID card.
Seventy percent of respondents to a
Pew Research Center poll supported
a "must carry" card -a card that the
government would require us to
carry on our person at all times and
"show a police officer on request."8 2
Perhaps most disturbingly, 49% of
respondents to a CNN/USA
Today/Gallup poll supported a
VOLUME . 79 ISSUE . 4 1 571
special national ID card that only
Arab-Americans would be required
to cany.8
3
Now, did the public suddenly
review empirical evidence suggesting
that national ID cards prevent
terrorism? Certainly not. This was a
reflexive response to the perception
of vulnerability. The public needed
to believe that there was something
the government could do to prevent
this type of attack In the wake of
September 11, fear and self-delusion
are empowered to drive the debate
over security proposals. Larry Ellison
claims that people need not give up
their privacy, only their "illusions" of
privacy.8 4 In the privacy-versus-
security debate, howcver, privacy
advocates often find themselves
opposing efforts to preserve the mere
illusion of security.
It is not enough, however, to point
out the intangible nature of the
security interest. That alone is
unlikely to change the debate,
precisely because people want, at
some level, to believe that
government can protect them against
foreign threats. Government, too, has
an essential interest in preserving this
perception.
Accordingly, privacy advocates
must also identify the tangible effects
of preserving privacy against
government intrusion. Speaking to a
class at Harvard's John F. Kennedy
School of Government in the fall of
2000, Simson Garfinkel said that
privacy advocates need to show
"where the bodies are buried."5 I
take him to mean that privacy
advocates will make relatively little
progress until they can show specific,
tangible harms flowing from
intrusions on privacy. His comment
recognizes the tangible-versus-
intangible perception that privacy
advocates often confront.
Garfinkel's point finds support in
the patchwork of privacy laws on the
books today. In the few areas where
we have found metaphorical "buried
bodies," Congress has offered a
healthy measure of privacy
protection, albeit in the most narrow
of circumstances. For example,
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act in the wake of the
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1989 stalking and murder of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer by a deranged fan
who found her address through the
department of motor vehicles.
86
Similarly, Congress passed the Video
Privacy Protection Act after Judge
Robert Bork's confirmation hearings,
during which a Washington Times
reporter shamelessly obtained copies
of Judge Bork's video store rental
records.
8 7
Privacy advocates, then, must
emphasize the tangible
consequences of what some would
dismiss as intangible aspects of
privacy - those related to autonomy,
to freedom of association and
expression, and to personal and
political identity. Joanna Malamud
Smith notes that systematic
deprivation of privacy by
government is a hallmark of
oppressive, totalitarian regimes.
88
Describing abuses in Nazi-occupied
France, cold war East Germany, and
the Soviet Union, Smith observes
that:
Constantly spying and then
confronting people with
what are often petty




... . [Elven when one
shakes real pursuers, it is
often hard to rid oneself of
the feeling of being
watched - which is why
surveillance is an extremely
powerful way to control
people. 89
Smith quotes a memoir of a woman
who lived under Stalinism: "'An
existence like this leaves its mark. We
all became slightly unbalanced
mentally -not exactly ill, but not
normal either: suspicious,
mendacious, confused and inhibited
in our speech .... "'90 Such
campaigns are nothing less than
state-run terrorism.91 Viewed from
this perspective, privacy seems less
an intangible abstraction than it does
an instrumental value that produces
tangible effects essential to a free
citizenry.
Nor are deliberate assaults on
privacy confined to totalitarian states.
Smith also notes that the U.S.
government has spied on dissenters
such as Emma Goldman, the
Wobblies, Malcolm X, and Martin
Luther King, Jr.92 Smith recounts the
FBI's attempts to force King to
commit suicide by sending him and
his wife videotapes of King's sexual
infidelities. 93 "Along with the videos,
King received an anonymous letter.
Knowing that he had attempted
suicide as a twelve-year-old child, the
writer, an FBI agent, encouraged
King to end his life."94 J. Edgar
Hoover used the FBI's surveillance
capabilities for his personal gain.
One Hoover biographer tells the
story of a magazine publisher who
was planning an expos6 on Hoover
and the FBI.95 "Hoover struck first,
viciously. Favored newspaper
contacts all over the country received
a plain brown envelope with no
return address. Inside was a packet
of photographs showing the
publisher's wife engaged in fellatio
with her black chauffeur."96 Thus,
invasions of privacy empower the
invader to control information and
quell dissent.
IV. CONCLUSION
T oday, police in Washington, D.C.
are building a centralized
network of surveillance cameras that
will blanket the District Qf
Columbia. 97 This unprecedented
initiative operates within the
cryptically named "Synchronized
Operations Command Complex" (the
"SOCC"). 98 In the SOCC's Joint
Operation Command Center, fifty
workers monitor a wall of video
screens hooked up to surveillance
cameras. 99 The network already
includes 200 cameras in public
schools.' 0 0 The SOCC will soon add
another 200 in subways and parks.10'
It will also link the video from
surveillance cameras that monitor
intersections for drivers who run red
lights, and from private cameras in
banks, retail stores, hotels, and
apartment buildings.10 2 According to
the director of the project, "I don't
think there's really a limit on the
feeds it can take. We're trying to build
. the capability to tap into not only
video but databases and systems
across the region."' 0 3
A man living under a
similar surveillance
network in Britain
observed: I am gay and I
might want to kiss my
boyfriend in Victoria
Square at 2 in the morning.
I would not kiss my
boyfriend now. I am aware
that it has altered the way I
might behave. Something
like that might be regarded
as an offense against public
decency.104
Despite this, the man maintains that
"the benefits of the cameras
outweighed the costs, because
'thousands of people feel safer. "105
As William Safire asks: "Is this the
kind of world we want16
Policymakers are now deciding the
fate of the D.C. video surveillance
network, in addition to countless
other security measures. If they
accept uncritically the tangible-
versus-intangible framework, their
decision may be foreordained. The
framework suggests a simple
question: Which is more costly -the
destruction from a terrorist attack on
our capitol, or the discomfort that a
commuter, tourist, or student might
feel when passing innocently before
a surveillance camera?
This essay has tried to illuminate
what really lies on either side of the
scale. First, the framework's short-
term temporal focus necessarily
excludes the future uses of such a
surveillance network. Even today,
the project is considering linking not
only surveillance cameras, but also
"databases and systems across the
region. 1'7 The potential uses of
centralized video surveillance and
databases are unlimited, as are the
long-term privacy intrusions of such
expanded uses.
Second, the factual context in
which the question is posed
necessarily suggests the answer. We
are left to imagine a known terrorist
riding the Metro or walking across
the Capitol Mall en route to his target.
Even if one understands as a
conceptual matter that the privacy
consequences of pervasive
surveillance will be widespread, it is
difficult to measure such seemingly
intangible harms against the prospect
of another devastating terrorist
attack. To accept the limited context
in which the framework places the
issue is to determine the outcome of
the decision.
Finally, even if the surveillance
system employed facial recognition
technology that was 100% accurate -
an extremely unlikely possibility 08 -
it could not prevent terrorist attacks.
Only two of the nineteen September
11 hijackers were on the terrorist
watch list; the rest were unknown to
intelligence or law enforcement
officials before the attacks. 1°9 To
catch even those two with facial
recognition technology, the
government would have needed not
only their names, but also digital
images of their faces. Like the
pervasive surveillance network in
Britain, centralized surveillance in
D.C. would be better suited to
making people feel safe rather than
actually stopping terrorists.
So the question that policymakers
Must in fact decide is far more
complex than the tangible-versus-
intangible framework would suggest.
The security side of the scale is much
less substantial than many would
suspect, because it is both
empirically suspect and comprised in
large part of mere perceptions of
security. Similarly, the privacy side is
weightier than the framework would
admit, because it includes the long-
term effects that unintrded
conseqtuences will have on privacy,
and because it considers the effect
that security measures will have on
the entire community, rather than on
a single individual passing a
checkpoint Moreover the privacy
side of the scale holds far more than
mere abstractions. Instead, intrusions
on privacy can change behavior,
control information, and deter
political and cultural dissent, This
more comprehensive way of
approaching the security-versus-
privacy debate makes decision-
makers far more likely to protect
privacy.
In an important address to the
nation, President Bush warned,
"Freedom and fear are at war." it in
that context, Bush equated freedom
with America, and fear with the
Taliban and At Qacda. In the
aftermath of September I], however,
privacy values arte safeguarding our
freedom, while some security
proposals seek mainly to alleviate
our fear. Freedom and fear are
indeed at war. Let us not sacrifice the
former by indulging the later.
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department of the Boston law firm
Bingham Dana. The ideas in Part I
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from the author's forthcoming
article, Reasonable Expectations and
the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
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